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INTRODUCTION

In Bankruptcy Fire Sales, Professor LoPucki and Dr. Doherty do two
things. First, they present provocative data about the relative payoff to be
had in Chapter 11 by a full reorganization compared with the payoff from a
section 363 sale without a full reorganization. Second, they give a yet more
provocative explanation for their data. Taking a page from Professor
LoPucki's recent book, they blame the meager return that they observe on
363 sales on the unprincipled behavior of the lawyers, managers, creditors,
investment bankers, and even judges involved in the sales.
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's data appear to show that firms that leave
Chapter 11 through the side door-that is, via section 363 sales-bring far
less for their creditors than they would bring if they had left via the front
door as reorganized companies:
[C]ompanies sold for an average of 35% of book value but reorganized for
an average fresh-start value of 80% of book value and an average market
capitalization value-based on post-reorganizations stock trading-of 91%
of book value. Even controlling for the differences in the prefiling earnings
of the two sets of companies, sale yielded less than half as much value as
reorganization.
*
Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. The pronoun
"we" refers to some combination of Audra Renyi and Carlo Lamberti, both of Miller Buckfire and
Company; Lingling Zhang; Brett Burnham, Michigan Law '08; Brandon Conrad, Michigan Law
'08; Jacob Lehman, Michigan Law '09; and Angela Tyler, Michigan Law '07. 1 am particularly
indebted to Ms. Renyi for her work on the corporate data, to Ms. Zhang for her statistical expertise,
and to the wild men for their work on the numbers, interviews, and general research. Several of
them have a claim to be recognized as a co-author of this Response.
1.
4 (2007).

Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-
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So if you leave bankruptcy through the side door, you reap 35% of book
value, but if you leave through the front door, you get as much as 91%.2
These are astounding numbers. If they are accurate, why would anyone,
a creditor, a judge, or even the debtor or the debtor's lawyer, choose a 363
sale over reorganization? Professor LoPucki finds that most of the actors on
the bankruptcy stage have malign motives-to bring more cases to their
courts (the judges), to earn payments from third parties who buy their companies (the managers), or to ingratiate themselves with future clients (the
investment bankers). It goes without saying that Messrs. LoPucki and
Doherty doubt the auction market's ability to produce fair value.
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's article grandly avoids the traditional
empiricists' nightmare, the null hypothesis. Academic papers that have
failed because the data collected neither prove nor disprove the hypothesis
are common. The problem for Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty is the opposite;
their data are so powerful that many will find them impossible to believe. If
a typical company that is worth $91 million in reorganization is truly worth
only $35 million in a 363 sale, either the auction market must be grossly
inefficient or-contrary to all belief-the reorganization process is so efficient that it enhances the value of the companies reorganized.
In this paper I raise two other possibilities. First, I believe that Messrs.
LoPucki and Doherty's enterprise numbers overstate the value that goes to
the reorganized companies' creditors. Second, I believe there is a selection
error in the samples of Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty. Although the cases
where reorganization occurred look much like the cases where there was a
363 sale, I believe that they are systematically different and that that difference explains a part of the apparent difference in payoff to creditors.
Note, too, that while a casual reader of the quote above might conclude
that the entire difference between 80% (or 91%) payoff and 35% payoff is
attributable solely to the choice of a 363 sale or a full reorganization, that is
not the real claim of Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty. Table 1 and the discussion that follows on page 24 of their article show that the authors claim only
that about 30% of the variance in the recovery ratios can be explained by the
choice of sale versus reorganization.' Careful examination of Table 1 will
reveal what most suspect, namely that at least some significant part of the
difference is explained by the earnings and earning potential of the companies. Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty put the influence of earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA") at around 13%.
I.

VALUE TO CREDITORS

In 363 sales, there is an explicit payment for the company leaving Chapter 11. With some adjustments, that payment is the value that goes to the
creditors. But there is no paymaster standing at the door of the reorganiza2. Our results from the LoPucki model and data are similar to those reported in the
LoPucki/Doherty study. See infra Appendix A.
3.

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 23 tbl. 1.
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tion exit to hand out checks to the company's creditors. So one must somehow value the assets that are passed to the creditors in a confirmed plan of
reorganization. That value is usually "the company," but what is "the company" and how should it be valued?
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty measure the value of the reorganized
companies in two ways. In the first, they use the asset side of the newly reorganized company, and in the other they use the equity and liability side.
They use "fresh start accounting value" to find the value of the assets and
equate value of all of those assets to the value of the company. In the second, they estimate the value of the reorganized company by adding equity
market capitalization to all of the liabilities of the reorganized company.
Fresh start accounting, commonly used with reorganized companies,
calls for the company to write its assets up or down to present value. If cash
flow analysis or other methods of evaluation show that the company is
worth more than the total value of the tangible and intangible assets whose
value can be estimated by market comparisons (or by other means), the
company adds "goodwill" to bring the value of all of the assets up to the
apparent value of the company. Because total value of the newly reorganized
company will be derived from calculations of discounted cash flows and
other equally problematic data, fresh •start
•
4 accounting necessarily rests upon
a series of assumptions and estimations that are sometimes wrong. And
there is reason to believe that the parties in the reorganization sometimes
push the values up or down to suit their interests.5 Using only the asset side
of the balance sheet, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty treat the companies as
worth the full amount of the current and other assets shown on the fresh
start balance sheet.
Appreciating that they might be criticized for relying on a subjective
fresh start value, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty used actual postconfirmation stock trades to find an actual market value for the reorganized
companies.6 Their "market cap value" is the total of the value of stock outstanding plus all liabilities. 7 They treat the following formula as the measure
of the company's value: value = (shares of stock outstanding x value per
share) + (long-term debt) + (all other liabilities).8
Since all the reorganized companies came out of bankruptcy as public
companies,9 we have actual market values to show the value that was in fact
provided to the creditors. For that reason there is no need to review the less

4. RICHARD A.
(7th ed. 2003).

BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE

97

5. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson et al., Valuation of Bankrupt Firms, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 43, 45
(2000); Reuven Lehavy, Reporting Discretion and the Choice of Fresh Start Values in Companies
Emergingfrom Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 7 REV. ACCT. STUD. 53, 55 (2002).
6.

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 21.

7.

Id.

8.

Using Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's numbers I find their regression models to be accu-

9.

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note I, at 48-49.

rate.

HeinOnline -- 106 Mich. L. Rev. 693 2007-2008

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:691

accurate fresh start estimations and so we disregard them.' ° Focusing on
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's market cap valuations, I believe that their
addition of all "other" liabilities exaggerates the value of the firms. Adding

equity and debt is a way to estimate an asset's ability to produce a financial
return to its owners. To find the present value of an asset's financial return
over its life is, for corporate evaluators, the gold ring. Modem financial the-

ory posits that it is irrelevant whether the rights of the "owners" are
characterized as common stock, preferred stock, debt, or in some other way.
10. The total of the fresh start assets for the reorganized firms shown on Messrs. LoPucki
and Doherty's appendix A-2 also exceeds the values that we have computed as the Total Enterprise
Value ("TEV") of the reorganized companies. Id. That difference can be explained several ways.
First, nineteen of the thirty reorganized companies show intangible assets among their fresh start
postbankruptcy assets. Intangibles, such as "goodwill," represent someone's guess about the amount
by which the value of the firm will exceed the value of the hard assets and is, of course, quite subjective. So the values may be exaggerated. Second, it is probably a mistake to add current assets
without netting them against current liabilities. As indicated below, including short-term assets, like
inventory, without considering the offsetting liability may distort the value of the firm where those
assets go through frequent cycles in which the short-term assets and short-term liabilities may rise
and fall; thus, a snapshot on day one may show a quite different company than a snapshot five days
later when inventory (and the offsetting liability for its cost) have been reduced. See infra text accompanying notes 18-19. Third, a buyer of the assets who intends to operate the firm is unlikely to
value the current assets of the firm as having lasting value because of their short life as part of the
company's working capital.
The following chart is from TOM COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION 160 exh. 6.4 (2d ed. 1995).
Note that Copeland and his co-authors do essentially the same analysis on the Hershey Company
that Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty have done with their thirty firms. Id. Using the assets to determine invested capital (that is, value of the firm), Copeland subtracts non-interest-bearing current
liabilities from current assets. Id. Using the equity plus debt to determine value, he arrives at the
same number for invested capital by totaling equity, deferred income taxes, and interest-bearing
debt. Id. But he does not add any non-interest-bearing liabilities to find the company's invested
capital.
HERSHEY FOODS CORP.,
INVESTED CAPITAL CALCULATION, $ MILLIONS

Operating current assets

1990
661.8

1991
702.3

1992
760.9

Non-interest-bearing current liabilities

(276.4)

(362.7)

(351.7)

Net working capital

385.4

339.7

409.2

Net property plant and equipment
Other operating assets, net of other liabilities

952.1
(18.9)

1,145.7
(50.9)

1,296.0
(55.8)

Operating invested capital
Excess marketable securities

1,318.6
0.0

1,434.4
42.1

1,649.4
0.0

Goodwill
Nonoperating investments

417.6
0.0

421.7
0.0

399.8
179.1

Total investor funds
Equity

1,736.3
1,243.5

1,898.3
1,335.3

2,228.3
1,465.3

Deferred income taxes
Adjusted equity

154.5
1,398.0

172.0
1,507.3

203.5
1,668.8

All interest-bearing debt
Total investor funds

338.3
1,736.3

391.0
1,898.3

559.5
2,228.3
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The financial return is typically the discounted value of the free cash flow
that the asset would generate for the owners."
We can estimate that number for a firm by totaling the market value of
the current owners' interest (Total Enterprise Value or "TEV"). If a company
has no debt and only one class of stock, the TEV of the company would be
the total market value of the stock (number of shares x market value per
share). Since modern financial practice recognizes long-term debt (sometimes described as interest-bearing debt) as an ownership interest, one
would need to add the principal amount of debt outstanding if the firm issued both stock and debt. But, contrary to the calculation of Messrs.
LoPucki and Doherty, neither the literature nor the practice treats noninterest-bearing debt as an ownership interest. In my opinion, their "market
cap" numbers are substantially exaggerated by the improper inclusion of
non-interest-bearing debt."
In their study on the valuation of bankrupt firms, Professor Gilson and
his co-authors describe the standard capital cash flow method of valuation
as follows:
We use a capital cash flow (CCF) model to value cash flows, as developed
in Ruback (1998). Capital cash flows measure the cash available to all
holders of capital and include the benefit of interest and other tax shields.
The CCF method values the firm by discounting capital cash flows at the
discount rate for an all equity firm with the same risk. The firm's estimated
going concern value equals the discounted value of projected capital cash
flows plus a terminal value representing the present value of cash flows after the projection period.

1I. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 97. As Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty point out
in their reply, it would have been best to use market value of debt (rather than face value) to measure
the TEV of all of the firms on their entrance into Chapter II. That is because much of that debt
would have an actual value substantially less than its face value in anticipation of the firm's default
on that debt. While debt, even debt of companies in or approaching Chapter 11, is often traded, there
is no public published market for that debt and historic prices are hard to find. While we found the
price of some debt for some companies, for most of the sixty companies in the sample, we could
find only fragmentary data, and we could not find any market price for most of the debt of most of
the sample. Accordingly, we used face value as the best alternative.
Because we did the same thing for the 363 sale companies that we did for the reorganized
companies, the use of face value does not distort the findings-at least not in our favor. Use of the
face value in place of market value probably favors Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's results. If my
hypothesis-that the 363 firms are a different and weaker subset of firms-then use of debt's face
value exaggerates their entering TEV (and so reduces the apparent return from their 363 sales) more
than the use of face value exaggerates the apparent TEV of the reorganized firms.
12. For both sale and reorganization cases, we use the latest market price of the stock that is
listed in the Center for Research in Security Prices ("CRSP") database. In numerous instances, the
date is only one day before the filing date. In other cases, the stock stopped trading up to two years
before the company filed for bankruptcy.
Since only five companies had share prices over $1.25 (most were under $0.50) Messrs.
LoPucki and Doherty's claims that we overstated the values by using stock price that sometimes
preceded the filing by days or weeks is wrong. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 26-27. The
amount of time between the last trading day and the date of filing is not well correlated with the
market price. Some companies' stock had negligible market value long before the filing. See infra
Appendix B.
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Cash flow adjustments include adding back depreciation, amortization, deferred taxes, and after-tax proceeds from asset sales, and subtracting
working capital investment and capital expenditures."

In the appendix to their article, Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback compute
the postbankruptcy enterprise value for six firms that are leaving Chapter 11.
They described the process as follows:
At the end of each case we report the company's actual enterprise value
immediately following Chapter 11, when its reorganization plan becomes
effective (Postbankruptcy enterprise value). This latter value equals the
face value (market value if available) of interest-bearing debt, and the market value of common stock (plus any preferred stock or warrants) on the
first day the firm's stock trades after it leaves Chapter 11.4
The most widely used financial text, Brealey and Myers, endorses the
omission of current non-interest-bearing liabilities in finding firm value.
Brealey and Myers distinguish between "short-term debt" that bears interest
(sometimes to be included) and "accounts payable" that do not (never included). Both their sample balance sheets and their discussion distinguish
between the two, and while they suggest that "short-term debt" should
sometimes be added to long-term debt and equity to determine value, they
make no such suggestion about non-interest-bearing accounts payable. They
discuss current liabilities as follows:
What about other current liabilities? Current liabilities are usually "netted
out" by subtracting them from current assets.- The difference is entered as
net working capital on the left-hand side of the balance sheet. The sum of
long-term financing on the right is called total capitalization.

Since current liabilities include short-term debt, netting them out
against current assets excludes the cost of short-term debt from the
weighted-average cost of capital. We have just explained why this can be
an acceptable approximation. But when short-term debt is an important,
permanent source of financing-as is common for small firms and firms
outside the United States-it should be shown explicitly on the right side
of the balance sheet, not netted out against current assets. The interest cost
of short-term debt is then one element of the weighted-average cost of
capital."
Why is non-interest-bearing liability (such as accounts payable) excluded in estimating the firm's enterprise value? It is because holders of
trade payables are not in any sense "investors or owners." Remember, we are
trying to determine the value of the firm by totaling certain amounts that

13.
14.
15.

Gilson et al., supra note 5, at 49.
Id. at 71.
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 529 (emphasis omitted).
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may be only proxies for value; we are trying to determine what a prospective buyer would pay to the firm's "owners" to acquire the entire firm. 6
Professors Modigliani and Miller have taught us that the composition of
invested capital (all equity or a combination of equity and debt) is not an
important determinant of the value or success of a firm." That teaching necessarily requires us to treat at least long-term debt as a proxy for equity. So,
for example, bondholders' claims to "ownership" are only incidentally related to the fact that they are creditors of the firm. Their status as equity
substitutes arises from the extended term of their debt and the control that
they might exercise. While it is a mistake to infer ownership merely from
status as a creditor, reasonable people could differ about whether any particular creditor should be treated as an owner (and so have his debt added in
as a part of the firm's value). But I believe Messrs. Doherty and LoPucki's
routine inclusion of non-interest-bearing debt is wrong."
In their reply, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty complain that I include all
payments, even those to trade creditors, as part of the payment in a 363 sale
(and so treat all of the amounts paid as a return in such a sale), but that I do
not add non-interest-bearing debt to stock equity and interest-bearing debt to
value reorganized companies. They correctly describe what I have done but
are otherwise wrong. They are wrong to say that the creditors-the collective residual claimants in the bankruptcy--could ever receive more from
reorganization than the value of the firm. The value of the firm is the value
that goes to the creditors, and, by hypothesis, it is the most that could go to
them. Contrary to Messrs LoPucki and Doherty's contention, the value to
the "creditors and to the owners" is the value to the "owners" who are the
creditors of the bankrupt firm.
What goes to the creditors in a 363 sale is the price. What goes to the
creditors in reorganization is the firm. To say that one must add noninterest-bearing debt here because creditors holding non-interest-bearing
debt might receive a payment in liquidation is a nonsequitur. Deriving the
value of an enterprise by adding the value of equity and the value of certain
of its debt is a way to approximate the value of the enterprise, not a way to
measure the value that goes to any particular claimant.
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty and I have used different means to value
the output of 363 sales on the one hand and the output of reorganizations on

16. In some ways long-term debt walks, talks, and looks like equity. Like a stockholder, the
holder of a ten-year bond has a long-term interest in the success of the firm. Frequently the bond is
protected by covenants of the firm that constrain the firm's ability to take on new debt, subordinate
new debt, or render the existing debt due and payable on a change of control of the firm. Where they
apply, these promises give control to the bondholders analogous to the control shareholders exercise
through the board of directors.
17. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
18. For elaboration on and examples of the use of debt and equity as a mode of valuing a
firm, see ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION chs. 11-12 (1996); PATRICK A.
GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 479 (3d ed. 2002);
STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS 106-08, 113 (2005).
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the other. We all use the price in one case and the TEV in the other, but only
I have used the accepted method of finding TEV.
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty face at least one major practical problem
when they treat transient creditors as owners. Assume A and B are two companies of equal value. At time 1 each has equity market cap of $5 million;
each has long-term debt of $5 million and current liabilities of $1 million.
Each has current assets of $2 million and plant and equipment of $6 million.
Ignoring current liabilities, both have enterprise values of $10 million at
time 1; adding current liabilities, as Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty have
done, would show each to be worth $11 million at time 1.
Between time 1 and time 2, A's balance sheet does not change; but, during that time, B acquires inventory of $1 million and incurs an offsetting
obligation to pay $1 million for the inventory in 90 days. At times 1 and 2,
each company's net worth is $2 million. However, at time 2, company B has
liabilities of $7 million (including the account payable of $1) and assets of
$9 (including the inventory of $1).
Now consider their finances at time 2. Using the conventional model,
each will still have enterprise value of $10 million (5+5). Using the
LoPucki/Doherty model, A will still have enterprise value of $11 million
(5+5+1) but B's value will have risen to $12 million (5+5+1+1). The addition of the $1 million account payable causes an apparent increase in the
value of B even though that payable is offset by an asset of $1 million. To
further see the perversity inherent in the LoPucki/Doherty model, assume
that, at time 3, B has retired its payable and A has incurred a $1 million payable. Now the LoPucki/Doherty model shows A to have an enterprise value
of $1 million more than B has.
So far we have considered only the valuation of the companies that were
reorganized; we have ignored the values assigned to the companies that
were sold under section 363. Since the value is paid to the estate either directly or indirectly in 363 cases and then distributed among the creditors of
the company that has been sold, the value conferred on the creditors is more
straightforward in the 363 cases than in the reorganizations. In most cases
the value should equal the 363 sale price.
Comparison1: TEV Recalculated
After the TEV is recalculated to remove non-interest-bearing debt from
the evaluation formula, the average return in reorganization cases drops
from 88% to 53%. More important, pre-filing EBITDA now explains 9% of
the variation in the recovery ratios, and the addition of the
sale/reorganization adds only 3% to the explanation. The sale/no sale variable does not have statistical significance even at the 90% confidence level.
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED RECOVERY RATIOS ADJUSTED FOR

EBITDA' 9

Without Seven Telecom
All

Companies

Diff =Diff
Average ratio

Sales
Reorg

31%
40%

sale minus reorg
-9%

Average ratio
34%
40%

sale minus reorg
-6%

In layman's terms, these data show that one cannot reliably predict
whether a firm in Chapter 11 will yield a greater return through a reorganization or a 363 sale. If one accepts these calculations, the hypothesis that
reorganization can be predicted with statistical certainty to produce greater
returns than a sale is disproved. 0
Comparison2: Using TEV as Starting Value
In the belief that TEV at the time of filing is a better estimate of the
value of a firm than the balance sheet value of its assets as used by Messrs.
LoPucki and Doherty, we compared the returns of the thirty reorganized
firms with the return of the 363 sales firms after substituting TEV at date of
filing for book asset value and then running the LoPucki comparison. By
that standard, the reorganized firms delivered 70% of their entering value
and the 363 sales firms returned 64%." The decision to sell or to reorganize
made no difference in the potential recovery-the
difference between the
22
returns was not statistically significant.
Controlling for EBITDA, one gets narrow differences in the recovery ratios with these numbers:

19. If companies A and B had the same pre-filing EBITDA ratio and a book value of $100
million each, and A is sold under 363 and B reorganizes, on average A would recover $9 million less
than B. If we exclude the telecom companies, A would recover $6 million less. The telecoms are
excluded as the most obvious examples of companies that could not have been reorganized for reasons given in the footnote and elaborated in Part II.
20. Removing the current liabilities from the LoPucki and Doherty calculation and the
Gilson valuation gets the regression results displayed in Appendix C.
21.
If one removes the seven telecom cases from the data, the average returns reverse: sales
78%, reorganization 70%. The seven telecoms excluded are Asia Global, Allegiance Telecom Inc.,
International Fibercom, Inc., DTI Holdings, Inc., Velocita Corp., Globalstar LP, and Network Plus
Corp. See infra Part III for a discussion of the reasons for omitting the telecoms.
22.

See infra Appendix D.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED RECOVERY BASED ON

Without Seven Telecom
Companies

All
Average ratio
Sales

52%

Reorg

53%

TEV

Diff
sale minus
reorg
-1%

Average ratio

Diff =
sale minus
reorg
5%

59%
54%

By this standard, sales and reorganizations have essentially the same recovery with the telecoms and, excluding the telecoms, the sales produce

larger average returns.
Comparison 3: Using TEV-Cash
If one follows the Wall Street practice2 1 of subtracting cash from the
firm's debt and equity capitalization, mirabile dictu sales show a larger av-

erage return than reorganizations in every possible combination:
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED RECOVERY RATIOS
AFTER CONTROLLING FOR

EBITDA

Without Seven Telecom
Companies

All
Average ratio

Diff=
sale minus reorg

Average ratio

Diff=
sale minus reorg

Sales

58%

8%

65%

15%

Reorg

50%

50%

23. See Investopedia, Total Enterprise Value, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tev.asp
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007) ("TEV = Market Capitalization + Interest-Bearing Debt + Preferred Stock
- Excess Cash."). The Investopedia website explains enterprise value as follows: "EV is calculated
as market cap plus debt, minority interest and preferred shares, minus total cash and cash equivalents. Think of enterprise value as the theoretical takeover price. In the event of a buyout, an
acquirer would have to take on the company's debt, but would pocket its cash." Investopedia, Enterprise Value (EV), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/enterprisevalue.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2007); see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 529; MOYER, supra note 18, at 105.
In their reply Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty criticize me for deducting all cash and not just
"excess cash." That is a fair criticism, and my practice may modestly exaggerate the apparent returns from sales. The deduction of all of the cash raised the return for both sets of data, but the
deduction of cash from the ending TEV on the reorganized firms modestly reduced the value of the
reorganized company at confirmation without any corresponding reduction of the return on the 363
cases because we used sale price, not TEV, to measure value of the 363 companies. We deducted all
of the cash because we could not determine what was "excess" and what was not, and because similar deduction of all cash is advocated by some commentators and is apparently the practice followed
by investment bankers and others in the business.
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T-TEST RESULTS USING TEV-CASH

Without Seven Telecom
Companies

All

Average ratio

P-value

Average ratio

P-value

Sales

75%

0.758

90%

0.341

Reorg

74%

74%

These numbers stand Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's conclusion on its
head. If they truly reflect the values gained from reorganization and from
363 sales, we should encourage sales and discourage reorganization, and we
should applaud the bankruptcy actors who facilitate 363 sales 4
Why do the 363 sales returns approach or exceed the reorganization returns when we use the TEV as a starting measure of value? If the 363 sales
companies were weaker than the firms that reorganized, but that weakness
was disguised by an exaggeration of the book value of the 363 sales firms'
assets, one would expect the 363 sales firms' entering values, as measured
by TEV, to be lower than the reorganized companies' entering values and the
ratio of sales prices to entering value to increase. Put another way, if the 363
sales firms systematically overstated asset values and the reorganized firms
did not overstate their values, one would expect the payoff ratios to increase
if one holds the payment in the 363 sale cases steady and substitutes entering TEV for entering book value of assets.
If our data are correct, the differences claimed by Messrs. LoPucki and
Doherty do not exist. At least as measured by these sixty companies, the

24. Although the change is not statistically significant, comparison of returns in reorganizations
and sales suggests that sales return a larger percentage of entering TEV than reorganizations do.
TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS

All
Pre-filing
EBITDA/Assets
ratio
Sale (0= reorg,
1 = sale)
Constant
R-square
N

I

II

.728
(1.272)

.815
(1.290)

Without Seven Telecom
Companies
I
II
.452
(1.305)

.158
(.280)

.564
(1.311)
.270
(.284)

-.643...
(.145)
0.7%

-.730**
(.212)
1.3%

-.581
(.150)
0.3%

-.718**
(.208)
2.3%

51

51

47

47

tp <.10, *p < .05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
For Sale/Reorg p = .576 with telecom companies, p = .347 without telecom
companies [from regression model on the logged ratio]
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expected return for creditors from a section 363 sale is no different than the
expected return from reorganization.

II.

SELECTION BIAS

For the purpose of this Part, I have assumed that firms sold in 363 sales
earned lower returns than the returns earned by the firms that reorganized.
Although I do not challenge LoPucki and Doherty's method of selecting
cases, I believe that the 363 sales cases are different from the reorganization
cases. To the extent that 363 sales return lower value than reorganizations
might, I believe that Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty read the causation backwards. Section 363 sales do not cause low value, but low value might cause
363 sales. Put another way, the firms that find their way into 363 sales are
weaker from the outset and that difference, not the process, explains lower
returns.
To their credit, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty have tested the two data
sets for certain differences. Chief among those is a comparison of the firms'
EBITDA. One might guess that the apparent differences would be explained
because the firms that successfully reorganized had better earnings than did
the 363 sales firms. Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty test for that and find that
differences in earnings account for only a small part of the difference. They
also take into account (in a way that I cannot quite understand) the fact that
many of the weakest companies in the 363 sales sample were telecommunication companies.
Some of the analysis of the data and some of the interviews with the
lawyers involved in many of the cases in the two samples give reason to believe that firms that leave Chapter 11 via a 363 sale are different from firms
that reorganize. I pick out the telecoms not because they are the only companies in the sale sample who were incapable of reorganization but because
they are an obvious example and easily demonstrate what I believe to be
true of other cases in the 363 sale sample.
Note that five of the 363 sale cases with the lowest returns were telecoms, mostly competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"). 5 Messrs.
LoPucki and Doherty have taken some account of the presence of telecoms
in their study, but I believe their list of telecoms is too long. I exclude only
those that appear to be not capable of reorganization. Thus, in my opinion
all of the telecoms that did not (and could not) reorganize should be excluded. To include companies in the study that cannot reorganize is like
including a few chapter 7 or chapter 13 cases in the study. Remember, the
purpose of the study is to compare the output produced by a company's use
of one process with the output that would be produced by that company's
use of the other process. If the company can realistically use only one of the
two processes, it does not belong in the study.

25. Specifically, International FiberCom, Inc., DTI Holdings, Inc., Velocita Corp., Globalstar
LP, and Network Plus Corp.
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The CLECs were formed in the 1990s to compete with the incumbent
local exchange carriers ("ILECs"), for example, SBC, Verizon, and Bell
South. The market cap of the CLECs fell from $86.4 billion in 1999 to
$32.1 billion in February of 2001 and finally to $3.77 billion in February of
2002. The CLECs in the 363 sales group and in the reorganization group all
filed for bankruptcy between December of 2001 and November of 2002.
Because CLECs derived most of their revenue by use of ILECs' facilities,
CLECs were crushed when court and administrative decisions allowed
ILECs to set prices for use of their lines and other facilities that proved too
high to permit CLECs to compete. When the CLECs failed, there was no
business to reorganize and, in most cases, trivial value in their assets. 26 Other
(non-CLEC) telecoms failed because there was not enough revenue in the
telecom market to sustain all of the firms that rushed into the market; these
companies had insufficient EBITDA to sustain themselves.27 In all seven of
the telecom sales cases it is easy to see why no reorganization was possible
and why the debtors' claims to that effect are credible. If the seven sale telecoms are removed from the LoPucki/Doherty sample but no other change is
made, the average ratio of sale price to book value for the 363 sales firms
increases from 35% to 41%.
Recall that eliminating the telecoms (in the TEV-cash comparison)
shows that sales give a larger average return (90%) than reorganizations
(74%). For me, this confirms the view that at least with regard to the telecoms, there is a sample error, that is, the telecoms are different from the
21
firms that reorganize.
The actions of some claimants in some of the firms diminished the returns from the 363 sales. As to those sales, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty are
right to claim that the sales were less efficient than they could have been.
But they are not necessarily right that these companies could have
26.

Elise A. Couper et al., Boom and Bust in Telecommunications, 89 FED. RES.
Q., FALL 2003, at 1.

BANK OF

RICHMOND ECON.

27. See Fotios C. Harmantzis, Inside the Telecom Crash: Bankruptcies, Fallacies and Scandals 1-3 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=57588 1. Harmantzis notes:
In the last three years, from 2000 to 2003, it has been unusual for a month to pass without an
announcement that a telecom company has missed a debt payment, or it is certain that it will
miss one, because revenues have fallen far short of the original expectations when loans were
made....
... The telecom bubble began deflating in 2000 and 2001, as the industry was straining under
the weight of excess capacity and enormous debt.
Id.; see also Beyond the Bubble, ECONOMIST, Oct. I1, 2003, at 4; Comeback Kid?, ECONOMIST, Sept.
21, 2002, at 3; Robert E. Litan, The Telecommunications Crash: What To Do Now?,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POL'Y BRIEF, Dec. 2002, available at www.brookings.edu/comm/
policybriefs/pbI 12.pdf.
28. We hypothesized that the market for the firms' debt at or around the time of filing would
show the opinion of informed market players about the strength and prospects of the firms. We
suspected that the debt of a firm destined for 363 sales would trade for a lower value (compared to
the firms' solvency ratio) than the debt of a firm destined for reorganization. We could not find
enough data on the historic market value of the various firms' debt to confirm or refute our hypothesis.
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reorganized at a larger value. For example, in both NTL and Bethlehem
Steel, the lawyers or the court papers disclose that there were bidders who
apparently would have outbid the winning bidder, but who wished to reject
the collective bargaining agreements. In each case, the unions foreclosed
those potentially higher bids by threatening to strike if a sale were made to
anyone who planned to abrogate the labor contracts.
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty dismiss the claims made by some of the
agents of companies that were sold as self-serving and unreliable. But there
are hints in the data which show that their skepticism may be misplaced. For
example, one might argue that the fact that Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty
could not find reliable published financial data on seven of the sale firms
within the year before their filing shows that these firms were failing so rapidly that their accountants could not keep up. Any firm in that kind of free
fall is a bad candidate for reorganization. And the prompt sale of many of
the firms that Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty report is consistent with the
idea that the creditors and debtor reached a quick consensus that sale was
the better alternative. Moreover, our respondents who worked with some of
the sale firms tell us that creditors, not the debtors or their agents, pushed
for sales for good or strategic reasons. These claims are not a priori implausible in Chapter 11 cases, which are notorious for multiple parties'
calculated pursuit of conflicting, selfish goals.
If, as I claim, the firms that were sold in 363 sales were significantly different from firms that successfully reorganized, the data-whether favoring
sale or favoring reorganization-show nothing. It is as though an epidemiologist studied the longevity of two apparently identical groups of adults,
one from New York and one from New Jersey, but where every New Yorker
had an undetected congenital heart defect. To infer anything about the longevity of the typical New York resident compared with the typical New
Jersey resident from such a study would be wrong. If the 363 sales firms
enter bankruptcy with congenital defects that do not afflict the reorganized
firms, we cannot blame the process for lower returns.
III.

EXPLANATIONS

To explain how judges, managers, representatives, and creditors of the
363 sales firms could have allowed, much less facilitated, the results that
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty find is a steep climb. If their data are right,
firms using 363 sales are making gifts of hundreds of millions of dollars to
the buyers of their firms. Why? To explain this behavior, LoPucki returns to
the bankruptcy noir theme that he argued so extensively in his recent book. 29
According to him (and to Doherty apparently), the managers are led to 363
sales by offers of payments from buyers; investment bankers and lawyers
are abandoning their fiduciary duties to current clients to find favor with
prospective clients; and creditors' committees have dubious but unspecified
29.

LYNN M. LoPucKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS COR-

RUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

(2005).
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"private agendas."30 Even the judges are "not... without their own stake in
the matter,"3' and approve sales despite the fact that the firms' claims for the
need to do 363 sales are "generally false. 32 So Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty do not have a kind word for even a single actor on the bankruptcy
stage. Everyone is at least a fool and most are knaves. But consider their
evidence.
A. Managers
In eleven of the thirty sale cases, the CEOs of the purchased firms received severance payments from or were hired by the buyer. Four of the
eleven went to work for the buyer and three became consultants. Messrs.
LoPucki and Doherty correctly state that such payments give the CEOs an
"incentive" to do the sale. But I do not believe that the presence of this incentive justifies the inference that the eleven acted improperly, or the
conclusion that "[w]e probably have only scratched the surface of managerial corruption in these cases."33 Apparently twenty-six of the thirty CEOs
lost their jobs. Pay and other CEO perquisites must have disappeared with
the job. Yet Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty take no account of managerial
incentives to eschew a 363 sale and keep the firm alive in Chapter II for
additional months or years in a quest for such forfeited pay and perquisites.
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty reject the firms' assertions that the firms
would not be viable as reorganized companies, but their principal evidence
for doubting the firms' assertions is that the firms' cash reserves did not decline as much or as fast as Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty hypothesized the
cash reserves would if the firms were not viable. Resting on this fragment of
evidence, the authors overlook the fact that seven of the 363 sales companies were telecoms 34 that had few assets and no business after they were
crushed by the ILECs or were starved by the lack of sufficient revenue to
feed all of the telecoms' hunger.
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty are equally critical of investment bankers.
They dismiss the possibility that the bankers might be eager to get a higher
price by the contingent fee that they sometimes earn on a sale, and they give
no credence to the possibility that a banker would feel obliged to represent
his client. Rather Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty believe that the investment
bankers abandon the interests of their clients in order to favor buyers in the
belief that the buyers are future clients. According to them, the bankers
blithely ignore the agent's fiduciary duty to his principal: "[t]he investment
bankers have little reason to curry favor with the sellers who hired them; the

30.

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 38.

31.

Id.at 40.

32.

Id. at 39.

33.

Id. at 34.

34.

See supra note 25.
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companies are going out of business so the interests of the managers and
professionals tend to dominate the hiring decisions."35
Examine that statement. These investment bankers are agents of the
debtor. They have contractual and fiduciary duties to represent their principals, the debtor firms. To suggest that they will casually disregard this duty
in order to pursue a richer interest elsewhere is unfair and illogical. 36 It may
not be in the economic interest of the bankers to disregard their duty to the
client/debtor. While it is true that the debtor will disappear, the professionals
do much of the hiring. These professionals, such as the debtor's lawyers and
agents for the creditors who have been stiffed by the behavior of their investment banker, may have long memories. Most of these lawyers and
creditors are repeat players. Even though the debtor will disappear, the lawyers will be back and so will the creditors who are often professional buyers
of distressed debt. These same creditors or their agents may be the persons
hiring the bankers in the next case. So any investment banker who courts a
buyer by arranging a low sale price will not only anger potential clients
among the firms' creditors, lawyers, and other agents, but also will taint any
claim to be a faithful advocate in his quest for appointment in a future bankruptcy where his reputation has preceded him.
There is also a direct economic cost to the bankers from a 363 sale. If, as
is likely, the bankers are being paid by the month or by some other unit of
time, they diminish that fee by cutting short the Chapter 11 by a sale. A full
reorganization will always extend the Chapter 11 proceeding and will increase the bankers' fees proportionately.
Finally, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's only evidence of banker misbehavior comes by remote inference. They describe the case of Polaroid where
the judge declined to approve the auction of a division of Polaroid for $32
million. Other bidders appeared in court and eventually caused the price to
rise to $60 million. Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty give credence to the complaints of other bidders, who complained that "they hadn't been solicited,
[and] they had difficulty getting bid packages from [the bankers]."37 They
give no credence to the possibility that the bankers merely made a mistake.
By trying to get too much (they apparently asked for $75 to $125 million),
they may have dissuaded would-be bidders. Nor do they consider the possibility that the complaining bidders, having themselves been derelict in the

35.

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1,at 35.

36. Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty even suggest that the bankers may "fix" the auction to
disfavor their client:
To be chosen as the stalking horse was a crucial advantage. The investment bank advising on
the sale had the ability to confer this advantage and the incentive to confer it on someone who
would reciprocate the favor....
...[It]
also

had the ability and incentive to maximize the advantage conferred by rushing the

sale.
Id. at 35-36.
37.

Id. at 36 (quoting LoPucKI, supra note 29, at 173-74).
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earlier parts of the auction, may have been expressing sour grapes in their
complaints to the judge.
By citing two cases among the thirty where creditors objected unsuc' '3
8
cessfully to the proposed sale and hinting darkly at the "private agendas
of members of the creditors' committee, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty ask
us to conclude that the creditors are displeased with these sales and that they
cannot or will not stop them even when they are not pleased. In one of the
anecdotes that they do offer (the sale of the Polaroid division), the creditors
objected; the court reopened the bidding; and the debtor doubled its price.
They assert without evidence that "[e]fforts to oppose a sale usually produce
only conflict and delay, to the unsecured creditors' further disadvantage."3' 9
This is thin soup. Out of thirty sales-each, in their eyes, apparently at
an objectionably low price-Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty give us only a
couple of anecdotes with unsuccessful objections. These are offset by one
successful objection. Unanswered is the question why creditors did not object in the other twenty-seven cases. They explain these only by speculating
about the cost of mounting an objection and by implying that the chances of
success are so low that challengers are discouraged. But if there are tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars on the table, as Messrs. LoPucki and
Doherty suggest, why would one hesitate to spend a few hundred thousand
to reap a share of those available millions? I am not persuaded.
B. Bankruptcy Judges and the Process of Bankruptcy Sales
It is not surprising that Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty regard the bankruptcy judges as no barrier to inadequate sales. Professor LoPucki has made
a name for himself by alleging that bankruptcy judges are in an unbecoming
competition for cases and that they will violate the law if necessary to attract
large Chapter 11 cases to their courts. 40 Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty make
a shortened version of that argument to explain why judges approve even
sales at inadequate prices.4 ' They note that no court has refused to approve
the sale of a public company in a modem case. They reject, as "selfserving," the claims of the debtors that the debtors could not successfully
reorganize or that a 363 sale would bring more than reorganization.42
Where is the evidence that the firms that used 363 sales could have successfully reorganized? And where-if you accept our data-is the evidence
that a 363 sale is a worse decision for these firms than reorganization would
have been? The CLECS whose fate is discussed above are a nice contrary
example. Those companies had no businesses to reorganize; once crushed
by the ILECs, they were dead hulks.

38.

Id. at 38.

39.

Id. at 39.

40.
41.

See LoPUCKI, supra note 29, at 137-81.
See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 39-40.

42.

Id.
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Finally, Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty criticize the auction process. Noting that the stalking horse was the winner in most of the sales, Messrs.
LoPucki and Doherty argue that the breakup fee and the overbid requirements foreclose others from competing with the stalking horse. While it is
true that use of a stalking horse can affect the sale price, the effect is minimal, and the advantages of using a stalking horse outweigh the potentially
lower sale price.

The use of stalking horses is a fairly recent addition to bankruptcy
41
sales. Use of a stalking horse sale has several advantages. The main reason
for using a stalking horse is to attract high bids early in the process by assuring the bidder that he will either win at the auction or be compensated for
his expenses in preparing a bid." It can also assure creditors that the busi45

46

ness in fact will be sold, attract additional bids, and provide sellers with a
baseline from which to compare competing bids.47 Some have argued that

the use of "stalking horse" protections in bankruptcy sales,4 and excessive
fees can have a negative effect on the auction price. However, the effects of

break-up fees and minimum bid increments in the amount observed in the
LoPucki/Doherty sample are minimal and cannot account for more than a
small chilling effect at the margins.
Because second bidders appear in only eight of the twenty-three sale
cases that LoPucki and Doherty looked at, and because competing bidders
were successful in only half of those cases, they conclude that "the ability of
outsiders to overbid at the auction is largely illusory" and that investment
bankers are passing bargains for favored clients. 49 However, the fact that the
stalking horse usually wins does not indicate a lack of a competitive market
43. Kermit Roosevelt Ill, UnderstandingLockups: Effects in Bankruptcy and the Market for
CorporateControl, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 121 (2000) (citing In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, 96
B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), as the earliest reported case of a lockup agreement in bankruptcy).
44. H. Jeffrey Schwartz & Carol A. Jones, Protectionsfor the Chapter 11 Asset Purchaser:
Break-up Fees, Topping Fees and Overbid Procedures, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1993, at 6, 6; Mark F.
Hebbeln, Comment, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference to Break-Up Fee Agreements in

Bankruptcy, 13

BANKR. DEV.

J. 475,478 (1997).

45. Tom Osmun & Soren Reynertson, Show Me the Money! Managing an Effective "363"
Sale, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 1997, at 32, 32.
46. See In re Integrated Resources, Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Such
fees may encourage the making of what is colloquially referred to as a 'stalking horse' offer, which
is an initial bid that is then 'shopped around' to attract higher offers." (quoting In re Marrose Corp.,
Nos. 89 B 12171 to -179, 1992 WL 33848, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1992))); Hebbeln, supra
note 44, at 478.
47. See Osmun & Reynertson, supra note 45, at 32; see also In re RSL COM Primecall, Inc.,
Nos. 01-11457, 01-11469, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 367, at *31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002) ("Approval of the Break-Up Fee is particularly warranted in the instant situation where the Purchaser has
negotiated a complex agreement that can serve as a floor for other parties to bid against'" (citing
Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), appeal dismissed, 3 E3d 49 (2d Cir. 1993); In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R. at 28)).
48. See Bruce Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J.
349 (1992); Roosevelt, supra note 43; Paul B. Lackey, Note, An Empirical Survey and Proposed
Bankruptcy Code Section Concerning the Propriety of Bidding Incentives in a Bankruptcy Sale of
Assets, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 720 (1993).
49.

LoPucki & Doherty, supranote 1, at 42.
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and certainly does not mean the sale price is a bargain being passed on to a
favored client. The more likely explanation for the lack of competing bidders is (1) interested buyers have already submitted their best bids in an
effort to become the stalking horse, and (2) the stalking horse price is at (or
near) market value.
As Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty note, the selection of the stalking
horse can be conceptualized as the "true sale."50 This is largely true, but not
for the reasons they imply. Because of the advantages given to the stalking
horse,5 interested buyers often submit competing bids during the selection
process,5 2 in effect turning the selection of the stalking horse into a mini auction. 3 Because interested buyers have already submitted their best bids in an
attempt to be chosen as a stalking horse, they do not attend the "official"
auction. In this situation the stalking horse price has been subject to competing bids and reflects the fair market value.
Even when the debtor does not solicit other bids before deciding on a
stalking horse, he cannot simply "pass bargains along to favored clients. 54
Courts must approve the selection of a stalking horse as well as any breakup fees and other fees to which the parties have agreed.5 When the fees are
excessive or unnecessary courts should (and do) refuse to approve the bid.56
If the court approves the stalking horse bid, there will be an auction at which
bidders will have the opportunity to outbid the stalking horse. Although the
stalking horse has an advantage in the auction, the protections given to the
stalking horse are not so advantageous as to make "the ability of outsiders to
overbid [the stalking horse] ... largely illusory" as Messrs. LoPucki and
Doherty claim.57
According to their data, the average breakup fee is 2.3% of the stalking
horse price and the average bid increment is 3.7% of the stalking horse
price. 58 These numbers are not unusually high. 59 These protections would
50.

Id. at 41.

51.

See supranotes 44-47 and accompanying text.

52. See Debra I. Grassgreen et al., Who Wins in the Race to Get Break-up Fees Approved?,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2003, at 52 ("[D]ebtors should fully vet potential offers before selecting a
stalking horse with which it will proceed forward." (citing Sierra Invs., LLC v. SHC Inc. (In re SHC
Inc.), 329 B.R. 438 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005))).
53. See Corinne Ball & John K. Kane, How To Handle Corporate Distress Sale Transactions, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONs 415 (2006);
Robert E. Steinberg, The Seven Deadly Sins in § 363 Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2005, at 22.
54.

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 42.

55.

See Hebbeln, supra note 44, at 477.

56. For cases in which the court has rejected break-up fees, see In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186
B.R. 98 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1995); In re America West Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994); In re Twenver, Inc., 149 B.R. 954 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); and In re Hupp Industries, Inc.,
140 B.R. 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
57.

See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 1, at 42.

58.

Id. at 35.

59. See Ronald L. Leibow et al., DistressedAsset Sales: Selling and Acquiring Assets from
the Debtor Estate, in 27TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION,
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only chill bidding if the stalking horse price was more than 96.3% of the
desired bidding price, and a competing bidder would win unless the stalking
horse price was within 97.7% of the competing bid. If the companies were
as undervalued as Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty suggest, a 2.3% break-up
fee or a 3.7% bid increment would not dissuade interested buyers. The
break-up fees and minimum bid increments should only affect the sale price
when the stalking horse price is close to market value. It does not explain
why bids do not go higher in sales if there were the deep discounts that
Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty claim.
CONCLUSION

Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty argue that the price of firms sold out of
Chapter 11 through section 363 is dramatically lower than the return that
would have been earned by a full-fledged reorganization of those firms. According to them, this happens because of the endemic misbehavior of the
bankruptcy actors.
I believe that their analysis of the numbers in their sample of sixty firms
is wrong. But even if their analysis is correct, I do not believe that their data
show that reorganizations bring larger returns than section 363 sales. Finally, even if their analysis were right, their assertions and insinuation about
bankruptcy actors' deceit and misbehavior are not justified by their evidence.

at 71, 92 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 5989, 2005) ("Break-up
fees generally fall within the range of two to three percent of the total value of the stalking horse
purchase price .... "). For cases approving break-up fees higher than 2.2%, see In re RSL COM
Primecall,Inc., Nos. 01-11457, 01-11469, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 367 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Apr. 11, 2002),
which approved a break-up fee of 3.1%, and In re Taa Beef Packing Inc., 312 B.R. 192, 197
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004), which approved of 1% to 4%.
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APPENDIX

A-I:

SALE PRICE TO BOOK PRICE RATIOS

ESTIMATED RECOVERY RATIOS
AFTER CONTROLLING FOR

EBITDA

RATIO

Without Telecom
With Telecom Companies

Companies

Diff =
sale minus
Average ratio
reorg

Diff=
sale minus
Average ratio
reorg

Sales

31%

Reorg

75%

-44%

38%

-44%

82%

T-TEST RESULTS
Without Seven Telecom
Companies (L's)
Average ratio
P-value
43%
<0.001
95%

All
Sales
Reorg

Average ratio
35%
91%

P-value
<0.001

All p-values labeled "t-test results" were generated using the logged ratio in a twosample independent t-test. P-values smaller than 0.05 indicate a significant
difference between the averages ratio. P-values greater than 0.05 suggest that we
don't have enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that the average ratios are
equal.

REGRESSION RESULTS

All
III
Pre-filing
EBITDA/Assets
ratio

2.867**
(1.043)

2.490**
(.873)

-.858***
(.117)
13%
51

.890"**
(.187)
-375*
(.141)
41%
51

Sale (0= reorg,
1= sale)
Constant
R-square
N

Without Seven
Telecom
Companies (L's)
I
II
1.717
(1.032)

1.504t
(.836)
-.763**
(.155)

-.656***
(.105)
6%
46

-.266*
(.116)
40%
46

tP < .10, *p< .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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APPENDIX A-2: MARKET PRICE AND TIME

Time before filing
market price
recorded (resource)
2 months (CRSP)
4 months (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
7 months (CRSP)
3 years (CRSP)
2 months (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
4 months (CRSP)
3 months (CRSP)
3 days (CRSP)
19 days (10o-K)
20 months (CRSP)
9 months (10-K)
1day (CRSP)
3 days (CRSP)
1day (CRSP)
9 days (CRSP)
2 months (CRSP)
3 days (CRSP)
2 1/2 years (CRSP)
7 months (10-K)
6 days (CRSP)
2 months (10-K)
20 days (CRSP)
1day (CRSP)
USING AVG'
USING AVG("
1day (CRSP)
2 months (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)

Sales
Market Price
(stock price per
share)
18.09
0.290
0.690
0.450
0.63
0.47
1.03
0.14
0.25
0.28
0.32
0.18
0.36
0.35
1.20
0.60
1.05
0.10
0.13
0.50
0.45
0.14
0.38
0.38
0.09
1.05
1.05
0.46
0.65
0.25

Reorgs
Time before filing
market price
recorded (resource)
1day (CRSP)
1 month (CRSP)
4 months (CRSP)
8 months (10-K)
3 months (CRSP)
2 months (CRSP)
6 months (CRSP)
1day (CRSP)
2 days (CRSP)
6 months (10-K)
11 months (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
8 months (10-K)
7 months (CRSP)
USING AVG121
1 day (CRSP)
8 months (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
2 months (CRSP)
USING AVG(Z
1 day (CRSP)
4 months (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
4 months (10-K)
2 months (CRSP)
4 months (CRSP)
6 months (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
1 day (CRSP)
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Stock
Price
0.09
1.00
0.09
0.39
0.65
0.40
0.27
11.75
2.45
3.14
10.60
0.75
0.00
0.39
1.25
0.35
0.30
0.54
0.20
1.25
0.09
0.34
0.04
0.44
0.13
0.20
0.38
1.03
0.22
0.41

Bankruptcy Noir

February 2008]

A-3:

APPENDIX

SALES AND REORGANIZATIONS

WITHOUT CURRENT LIABILITIES
T-TEST RESULTS

Without Seven Telecom
Companies

All

Average ratio

P-value

Average ratio

P-value

35%
53%

0.045

41%
53%

0.353

Sales
Reorg

Sales: ratio of sale price to book value; Reorg: ratio of exit TEV to book value

REGRESSION RESULTS

All
__________________
_____ I_______

Pre-filing
EBITDNAssets

2.112*
(.977)

II
1.964t
(.979)

Without Seven Telecom
Companies

I

II

1.844t
(.956)

1.775t
(.964)

ratio

Sale
(0=Reorg,

-.165
(.209)

-.267
(.213)

1 = Sale

Constant

-1.132**

-.985**

-1.060***

-.976***

(.112)

(.161)

(.110)

(.153)

8.9%
7.6%
12%
9%
47
47
51
51
tP <.10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
For Sale/Reorg p = .216 with telecom companies, p = .433 without telecom
companies [from regression model on the logged ratio]
R-square
N
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SALE AND REORGANIZATION RECOVERY RATIO

T-TEST RESULTS
Without Seven Telecom
Companies
Average ratio
P-value

All
Average ratio

P-value

Sales
64%
0.273
78%
0.770
Reorg
70%
70%
Sales: ratio of sale price to TEV; Reorg: ratio of exit TEV to filing TEV

REGRESSION RESULTS

Without Seven Telecom
Companies
I
II

All
III
Pre-filing
EBITDNAssets
ratio
Sale (0 = reorg,
1 = sale)

1.746
(1.078)

Constant

-.708***
(.123)
5.1%

-.694**
(.181)
5.1%

-.636**
(.126)
3.9%

-.683***
(.175)
4.2%

51

51

47

47

R-square
N

1.732
(1.097)

1.479
(1.090)

-.026
(.239)

1.517
(1.105)
.092
(.239)

tP < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
For Sale/Reorg p = .912 with telecom companies, p = .702 without telecom
companies [from regression model on the logged ratio]
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